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Silence Is Golden: Excluding Internal Complaints 
from ERISA Section 510* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are an employee who has just been terminated from her 
job.  Two days before, you complained to management concerning 
various ERISA violations you believe the company made.  You are 
certain that you were fired in retaliation for these complaints.  
Conversely, imagine you are an employer who has just eliminated an 
employee with a history of inappropriate behavior in the workplace.  
Previously, when you confronted the employee about his bad behavior, 
he remarked, “Where do you get off judging me when you are lying to us 
about the cost of our insurance!”  You shake off the comment and fire 
him two days later.  You subsequently receive notice that the 
troublesome employee is now suing your company for retaliatory 
discharge. 
These two hypotheticals highlight the issues involved in a growing 
circuit split surrounding the proper interpretation of section 510 of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).1  Section 510 
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 1. Section 510 of ERISA consists of three distinct clauses: 
  It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or 
discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is 
entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan, this subchapter, section 1201 
of this title, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act [29 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.], or 
for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant 
may become entitled under the plan, this subchapter, or the Welfare and Pension Plans 
Disclosure Act.  It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or 
discriminate against any person because he has given information or has testified or is 
about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this chapter or the Welfare and 
Pension Plans Disclosure Act.  In the case of a multiemployer plan, it shall be unlawful 
for the plan sponsor or any other person to discriminate against any contributing 
employer for exercising rights under this chapter or for giving information or testifying in 
any inquiry or proceeding relating to this chapter before Congress. 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006).  This Comment 
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protects an employee from discharge as a retaliatory act because she 
provided information, testified, or is about to testify in an inquiry or 
proceeding relating to ERISA violations.2  The split this section has 
caused in the circuit courts is indicative of the two competing desires of 
whistleblower statutes: (1) the protection and encouragement of 
employee rights on the one hand and (2) the desire to not hinder or 
constrict a company’s management of its business operations on the 
other.  Two circuits—the Fifth and the Ninth—have held that section 510 
protects internal complaints to management.  Three circuits—the Second, 
Third, and Fourth—appear to represent the majority view that these 
complaints do not fall within the purview of the statute because they are 
not a part of a formal inquiry or proceeding.  While the majority circuits 
are correct—section 510 of ERISA does not protect internal complaints 
made to management—their reasoning is unsatisfying because it relies 
too heavily on the plain meaning of the terms inquiry and proceeding.  A 
better explanation for why section 510 of ERISA does not protect 
informal complaints is found by making statutory interpretation one part 
of a broader analysis.  First, by comparing section 510’s antiretaliation 
provision with those of other federal statutes, one finds that Congress 
tailors these provisions specifically to achieve certain goals.  Therefore, 
Congress knows how to protect from retaliation internal complaints 
made to management should it want to do so.  Second, the exclusion of 
internal complaints from section 510’s protection is bolstered by 
examining its legislative history and comparing it with the similar 
whistleblower provision contained within Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.3  Finally, an explanation as to why Congress would not 
want to protect internal complaints can be gleaned by analyzing the 
underlying rights and interests protected by ERISA and balancing them 
against the interests of overburdened employers. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Brief Overview of Whistleblowing 
Whistleblowing pits two generally accepted social values against one 
another: the employee’s duty of loyalty and the individual’s duty to 
                                                                                                                       
deals primarily with the second clause of section 510, as that is the subject of the circuit split. 
 2. Id. 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
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society.4  Whistleblower protection statutes are thus in the unenviable 
position of encouraging employees to take actions detrimental to their 
employers’ interests.5  Statutes accomplish this by affirmatively 
protecting those employees from retaliation.6 
Generally, these statutes serve a dual purpose of protecting the 
employee while simultaneously advancing a higher policy goal of the 
government.  For example, although it did not affirmatively protect 
employees from retaliation, the False Claims Act7 passed after the Civil 
War sought to encourage employees to report the fraudulent practices 
their employers engaged in when dealing with the federal government.8  
The Act was a precursor to modern antiretaliation protections and serves 
as an early example of the federal government actively encouraging 
lawsuits to police unscrupulous employers.  However, the Act differed 
from modern antiretaliation statutes in its method of encouragement by 
only rewarding whistleblowers with a portion of the amount their 
employers owed to the government, as opposed to protecting the 
employees from retaliation.9  Even in this limited form, the Act helped 
Congress achieve its goal of encouraging employees to bring the 
wrongdoing of their employers to light.10 
The Railway Labor Act of 192611 represented the next evolution of 
whistleblower protection in the United States.12  The Act sought to curb 
employers’ ability to prevent their employees from organizing by making 
it a misdemeanor offense to influence or coerce workers regarding their 
status as members of a labor organization.13  Like the False Claims Act 
before it, the Railway Labor Act helped advance a key congressional 
goal: protecting unionization by affirmatively shielding employees—to 
some extent—from retaliation by their employers.14  In contrast with 
                                                     
 4. DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF 
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 2–4 (2d ed. 2004). 
 5. Id. at 3. 
 6. Id. 
 7. False Claims Act, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 698 (1863) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–
3733 (2006 & Supp. III 2010)). 
 8. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 4, at 3–4. 
 9. See id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–
188 (2006)). 
 12. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 4, at 5–6. 
 13. Id. at 6. 
 14. See id. 
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modern acts, however, the Railway Labor Act still provided little formal 
protection to employees making complaints against their employers.15 
Serious protection for whistleblowing employees did not come about 
until the 1970s and 1980s.16  The expansion in protections coincided with 
growing public perception and awareness that businesses and industries 
were engaging in illegal or corrupt practices at increasing rates.17  This 
perception led to the passage of several federal acts including the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),18 designed 
to regulate and punish employers for engaging in illicit activities.19  
Furthermore, the public’s perception of widespread corruption in the 
leadership of the country was not limited to the private sector, as 
evidenced by the Watergate scandal that led to the resignation of then-
President Nixon.20  The general public’s loss in confidence of highly 
placed persons in both government and business “created a climate 
favorable to whistleblowing.”21 
The ultimate ineffectiveness of statutes designed to curb illegal 
business practices helped further expand whistleblower protection.  In 
the 1980s, despite the enactment of expansive federal regulations such as 
RICO, the general perception persisted that illegal activities of employers 
remained unregulated by the federal agencies charged with monitoring 
them.22  This in turn led to a significant increase in the whistleblowing 
movement as employees began acting in their capacity as individual 
employees to solve the problem of corporate crime rather than relying on 
the federal government.23  It was amidst this climate of social upheaval 
that Congress enacted ERISA in the 1970s. 
B. Balancing Interests: A Desire to Protect Employers 
In constructing whistleblower or antiretaliation statutes, legislators 
attempted to balance the need to encourage employees to report 
                                                     
 15. See id. (stating that individual employees were not permitted to bring actions seeking to 
enforce the act). 
 16. Id. at 10–11. 
 17. Id. at 9–10. 
 18. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 
(1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006 & Supp. III 2010)). 
 19. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 4, at 9. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 10. 
 22. Id. at 11. 
 23. Id. 
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infractions with the interests of employers and managers in running their 
businesses without interference or state intrusion.24  Both in and out of 
the ERISA context, the protection and encouragement of whistleblowers 
presents a number of important challenges and concerns for employers.25  
Chief among these concerns are the financial costs associated with 
whistleblowing and the effect whistleblowing has on workplace morale 
and culture.26 
Financial costs associated with whistleblowing are a key interest of 
employers.  Passing antiretaliation legislation creates financial burdens 
on employers in the form of both preventative and responsive costs.  
Preventative costs include substantial lost time due to training and 
creating hotlines, as well as other means of reporting violations and 
utilizing the company’s remedial services.27  Furthermore, an 
organization facing a charge of unlawful retaliation must also bear the 
cost of investigating the charge, defending against the charge, and paying 
any damages awarded as a direct result of the charge.28  These costs are 
separate and apart from other costs to the organization that may be harder 
to quantify, such as negative publicity and lack of productivity.29 
High costs are a concern for the employer because they are a 
financial burden and may encourage an opportunistic employee to bring 
an antiretaliation action in the hopes that the employer will settle rather 
than expend the time and money necessary to defend the suit.30  
Similarly, leaving these costs unchecked may result in “too many 
whistles blowing.”31  Poor-performing employees could bring false 
complaints to prevent their employers from “taking legitimate adverse 
actions against them.”32 
Whistleblowing can also have a negative impact on the internal 
relations of the organization.  Conflicts can arise not just between the 
                                                     
 24. Gina Oderda, Note, Opposition at the Water Cooler: The Treatment of Non-purposive 
Conduct Under Title VII’s Anti-retaliation Clause, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 241, 249 (2010). 
 25. See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection: A Tale of 
Reform Versus Power, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 183, 220 (2007). 
 26. See James Fisher et al., Privatizing Regulation: Whistleblowing and Bounty Hunting in the 
Financial Services Industries, 19 DICK. J. INT’L L. 117, 133–34 (2000). 
 27. See Ramirez, supra note 25, at 226. 
 28. Fisher et al., supra note 26, at 134. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. at 133–34 (“In the face of these risks to the organization, an opportunistic 
whistleblower is in an excellent position to extort a settlement from the employer.”). 
 31. See Ramirez, supra note 25, at 223. 
 32. Id. 
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whistleblower and their employer but also between the whistleblower 
and their fellow employees as their coworkers try to either defend the 
whistleblower or the employer.33  Coworkers may feel resentment toward 
the whistleblower for disrupting the harmony of the group.  For example, 
coworkers may resent the whistleblower for creating an investigation to 
oust employees who were just following orders from their superiors but 
were complicit in the violations.34 
Looking specifically at the ERISA context, the primary cost to 
employers of whistleblower protection is likely the time and money spent 
answering legal claims.  This is because ERISA contains substantial 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements for determining the exact 
benefits due to an employee.35  These records are often the only evidence 
available to an employee seeking to prove an ERISA violation.36  Thus, 
some of the common costs of whistleblower protection to employers do 
not apply in the ERISA context.  For example, an investigation into a 
reported ERISA violation is likely to cost very little because all the 
information necessary to make a finding is available within the records.  
However, whistleblower protection still imposes high costs on 
employers, such as defending and paying judgments on suits brought 
under section 510 of ERISA and interfering with legitimate management 
decisions.37 
The costs of whistleblower protection are important and necessary 
considerations for legislatures in constructing antiretaliation statutes.  
Explaining why this is the case requires further insight into the 
emergence of whistleblower provisions.  Specifically, the desire to 
balance employer interests with public policy stems from the fact that 
antiretaliation provisions are an exception to the traditional rule of 
employment at will.  The employment at will doctrine holds that 
employment is terminable by either party—employer or employee—at 
will.38  Furthermore, the relationship is severable with good cause, no 
                                                     
 33. Fisher et al., supra note 26, at 133–34. 
 34. See Ramirez, supra note 25, at 224–25. 
 35. See 29 U.S.C. § 1059 (2006 & Supp. III 2010) (listing the recordkeeping and reporting 
requirement of employers). 
 36. See Laborers’ Pension Fund v. A & C Envtl., Inc., 301 F.3d 768, 783 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing 
Brick Masons Pension Trust v. Indus. Fence & Supply, Inc., 839 F.2d 1333, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
 37. See Winters v. Hous. Chron. Publ’g Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 732 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J., 
concurring); Fisher et al., supra note 26, at 134. 
 38. Elletta Sangrey Callahan, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment at Will Rule 
Comes of Age: A Proposed Framework for Analysis, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 481, 483 (1991). 
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cause, or a morally reprehensible cause.39  The rationale behind the rule 
is one of mutual rights: “an employee who cannot be compelled to work 
may not compel an employer to employ him or her.”40 
A primary purpose of antiretaliation provisions is to ameliorate the 
harshness of the employment at will doctrine.41  These provisions, 
however, cannot accomplish this without also intruding on employers’ 
traditional rights, including the right to decide whom that business 
employs.42  Thus, courts have held that the public policy exception for 
whistleblowers should be tailored to achieve a dual purpose of not 
interfering with lawful employers making ordinary employment 
decisions and protecting those employees who risk their jobs to protect 
the public.43 
C. ERISA and Section 510 
ERISA was passed by Congress and signed into law in 1974 with 
important policy goals in mind.44  ERISA sought to regulate pension 
plans by ensuring that employees received the benefits they were 
promised.45  In doing so, it made the security of these promises a 
prominent federal goal.46 
Pension plans such as those governed by ERISA are private in 
nature.  The onus is on individual employees to make a number of key 
decisions regarding their investment: whether to participate, how to 
allocate funds, and when to withdraw those funds.47  The federal 
government’s role in this pension system is purposely limited to 
providing tax incentives for contributions and the regulatory scheme of 
ERISA.48  This has led to the common three-legged stool allegory with 
                                                     
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Jenny Mendelsohn, Note, Calling the Boss or Calling the Press: A Comparison of British 
and American Responses to Internal and External Whistleblowing, 8 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 
723, 724–25 (2009). 
 42. See Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 732 (Doggett, J., concurring). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974); JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT 
INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 1 (2004). 
 45. WOOTEN, supra note 44, at 3. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Stephen F. Befort, The Perfect Storm of Retirement Insecurity: Fixing the Three-Legged 
Stool of Social Security, Pensions, and Personal Savings, 91 MINN. L. REV. 938, 946 (2007).  This is 
particularly true in the case of defined contribution plans, as opposed to defined benefit plans.  Id. 
 48. Id. at 945–46. 
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pension plans as one part of the basis of people’s retirement along with 
social security and personal savings.49 
To increase the security of pension plans, Congress imposes 
numerous reforms and requirements with which employers had to 
comply.50  First, ERISA creates fiduciary standards of conduct for the 
plan administrators.51  These standards require plan managers to act only 
in the interest of plan participants and to exercise the requisite care, skill, 
and diligence necessary to perform their duties.52  Second, ERISA 
requires pension plans to comport with minimum vesting standards, 
forcing employers to give employees a legal right to the benefits after a 
period of time specified by statute.53  Third, employers must take steps to 
ensure that pension plans will meet their long-term obligations, including 
setting aside financial resources before employees retire and participating 
in an insurance program that pays out vested benefits if a plan cannot.54 
These requirements create a set of duties with which employers must 
comply.  Conversely, they also imbue the plan beneficiaries—
employees—with rights.  Section 510 protects employees against 
interference with these rights by allowing them to bring claims against 
their employer.55 
More importantly, section 510 makes it unlawful to “discharge, fine, 
suspend, expel, or discriminate against any person because he has given 
information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or 
proceeding [involving ERISA].”56  This language is typical of other 
whistleblower protection statutes, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
and is commonly known as a “participation clause.”57  Whether internal 
complaints to management fall under the protection of ERISA’s 
“participation clause” is the focal point of the circuit split.58 
                                                     
 49. Vada Waters Lindsey, Encouraging Savings Under the Earned Income Tax Credit: A 
Nudge in the Right Direction, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 83, 83–84 (2010). 
 50. See WOOTEN, supra note 44, at 5 (listing ERISA reforms aimed at protecting employee 
pensions). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Christina A. Smith, Note, The Road to Retirement—Paved with Good Intentions but Dotted 
with Potholes of Untold Liability: ERISA Section 510, Mixed Motives and Title VII, 81 MINN. L. 
REV. 735, 743 (1997). 
 56. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006). 
 57. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 4, at 191–92. 
 58. Cristin Schmitz, No ERISA Whistleblower Protection for Unsolicited Internal Complaints, 
INSIDECOUNSEL, Sept. 1, 2010, at 74. 
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D. The Circuit Split 
1. The Minority View 
The two minority circuits were the first to analyze whether ERISA 
section 510 covers internal complaints to management.  Both decided in 
the affirmative.  However, the Ninth Circuit was the only one to provide 
detailed reasoning.  The foundation of the minority circuits’ reasoning, 
and the entire basis of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, is that failing to 
protect internal complaints from retaliatory discharge leads to 
problematic results and defeats the purpose of the statute.  In short, if 
internal complaints to management are not protected, unscrupulous 
employers too easily circumvent the purpose of section 510. 
In Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii, the Ninth Circuit became the first 
to address whether making internal complaints to management about 
ERISA violations is a protected activity under section 510.59  The 
employee, Hashimoto, sued her former employer alleging retaliation for 
making several internal complaints regarding potential or actual ERISA 
violations by her employer.60  Specifically, she had complained that her 
supervisor had told her to “recalculate a former employee’s pension 
plan” benefits using final pay rather than average pay—a violation of 
ERISA regulations.61  Hashimoto subsequently sued for wrongful 
discharge in violation of Hawaii’s Whistle Blowers’ Protection Act.62  
The Ninth Circuit found that this claim was preempted by ERISA 
because ERISA contains a provision specifically designed to protect 
whistleblowers such as Hashimoto.63 
The court in Hashimoto found that section 510 of ERISA protects a 
plaintiff who makes an internal complaint if the complaint is “protesting 
a violation of law in connection with an ERISA plan.”64  Interestingly, 
the court explicitly found that internal complaints of the kind Hashimoto 
made met the statutory requirement of being a part of an inquiry or 
proceeding.65  The first step in providing information or testifying in a 
way that may tempt an employer to discharge an employee would be to 
                                                     
 59. 999 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 60. Id. at 409. 
 61. Id. at 410. 
 62. Id. at 409. 
 63. Id. at 412. 
 64. Id. at 411. 
 65. Id. 
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first present the problem to the responsible ERISA managers within the 
company.66  If an employer discharges an employee who has made 
internal complaints, the process of providing information or testifying is 
circumvented from the outset because “the anticipatory discharge 
discourages the whistle blower before the whistle is blown.”67  In other 
words, if section 510 of ERISA did not protect internal complaints to 
management, employers would be able to evade the section’s purpose by 
eliminating a whistleblower before he has a chance to blow the whistle.  
Therefore, according to the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, section 510 of 
ERISA protects internal complaints to management. 
This interpretation of ERISA’s whistleblower statute is in line with 
the social climate that led to increased whistleblower protection in the 
1970s and 1980s.68  Individuals are encouraged to act rather than rely on 
government agencies and regulations to oversee and correct violations.  
The interpretation clearly favors the employee’s interests in enforcing 
her rights over the employer’s interests in running its business 
unencumbered.  This interpretation further assumes that this must have 
been Congress’s intent. 
In Anderson v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., the Fifth Circuit was 
the next to decide whether section 510 of ERISA protects internal 
complaints.69  Anderson’s position with the defendant employer placed 
him in charge of investments for all domestic short- and long-term 
pension portfolios.70  Anderson alleged retaliation for his refusal to 
commit illegal acts and for reporting the inappropriate conduct of a 
fellow employee.71  Specifically, Anderson alleged his employer asked 
him to sign payment invoices on behalf of the portfolios under his 
control—portfolios which his fellow employee had retained without the 
approval of the pension trustees.72  Performing this action is a clear 
violation of ERISA.73  Additionally, Anderson’s employer asked him to 
write up minutes for meetings on the company’s retirement plan—
meetings Anderson did not attend.74  Anderson asserted that he both 
                                                     
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 4, at 11. 
 69. 11 F.3d 1311 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 70. Id. at 1312. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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refused to commit the illegal acts and reported the incidents and 
improper conduct of his fellow employee to management.75  Soon 
thereafter, Anderson’s employer fired him.76  Anderson sued alleging 
wrongful discharge because in Texas, “employment-at-will contracts 
cannot be terminated because of the employee’s refusal to commit illegal 
acts.”77 
The Fifth Circuit, like the Ninth, first addressed whether ERISA 
preempted Anderson’s state law cause of action.78  The court concluded 
that ERISA preempted Anderson’s state law cause of action because the 
claim directly related to ERISA and would conflict with federal law.79  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court had previously held that ERISA’s 
preemption power was purposely expansive and was to be interpreted 
broadly.80 
Interestingly, the court in Anderson glossed over the internal 
complaints issue, stating simply that “ERISA § 510 broadly prohibits the 
termination or other adverse treatment of participants and 
beneficiaries.”81  Therefore, Anderson’s cause of action fell within the 
scope of ERISA’s civil enforcement provision.82  In so holding, the court 
effectively treated the eventual issue of a significant circuit split as a 
nonissue.  The court did not even cite to Hashimoto—the case that only 
one year before resolutely held that section 510 of ERISA protects this 
activity.83 
It is possible that the Fifth Circuit’s broad treatment of section 510 
stemmed from its analysis of ERISA’s preemption provision.  Namely, 
because the Fifth Circuit had previously held that the preemption 
provision of ERISA was “‘to be construed extremely broadly,’”84 other 
provisions of ERISA were to be given similarly expansive treatment.  
However, because the Fifth Circuit opinion did not explain its reasoning 
                                                     
 75. Id. at 1313. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. (citing Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985)). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1314. 
 80. Id. at 1315–16 (citing Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1209, 1217 (5th Cir. 1992)). 
 81. Id. at 1315. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. (holding that internal complaints are protected by ERISA’s civil enforcement 
provision, without reference to Hashimoto). 
 84. Id. at 1316 (quoting Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1328 (5th Cir. 
1992), abrogated on other grounds by Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993), as 
recognized by Rogers v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 933, 944 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
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for a broad interpretation of section 510, one is left to assume that the 
court did not view it as an issue worth addressing. 
Thus, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits were the first to address the issue 
of whether section 510 of ERISA protects internal complaints, and both 
concluded in the affirmative.  The Fifth Circuit apparently gave this issue 
little consideration, assuming that the section was broad in nature and 
meant to cover internal complaints.  The Ninth Circuit, on the other 
hand, provided far more insight into its reasoning.  Specifically, if 
section 510 of ERISA does not protect internal complaints, then the 
entire section is without purpose because employers could end 
whistleblower litigation before it begins.  This appeared to be the 
definitive case on the issue until King v. Marriot International, Inc.,85 
when the Fourth Circuit initiated the split. 
2. The Majority View 
The majority circuits made their decisions after the minority circuits.  
Each majority circuit decision built upon the reasoning and holding of 
the previous one.  The Fourth Circuit rejected internal complaints from 
section 510 protection because such complaints did not rise to the level 
of formality required by that statute.  Similarly, the Second Circuit also 
found that internal complaints did not fit the plain language of section 
510 of ERISA, although the court did provide a broader interpretation of 
the term inquiry to cover the informal gathering of information by 
employers.  Thus, if an employer contacts an employee, section 510 
protects what the employee says.  Finally, the Third Circuit recounted 
every case involved in the split and found the reasoning of the Second 
Circuit to be the most persuasive because section 510’s unambiguous 
language did not protect internal, unsolicited complaints to management. 
In King, the Fourth Circuit became the first to hold that internal 
complaints to management are not protected under ERISA’s 
whistleblower statute.86  The facts of the case were similar to those of 
Hashimoto and Anderson.  The plaintiff, King, worked in the defendant’s 
benefits department for several years and had a reputation as an excellent 
employee.87  In late 1998, she learned that the Senior Vice President of 
Compensation and Benefits for the company, defendant Fredericks, 
                                                     
 85. 337 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 86. See id. at 428. 
 87. Id. at 423. 
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planned to transfer millions of dollars from Marriott’s medical plan to its 
general corporate reserve account.88  King felt the transfer was 
inappropriate and expressed her concerns to both coworkers and 
Fredericks.89  Despite King’s misgivings about the proposed transfer, 
Fredericks promoted her in late 1999.90  Fearing that the transfer was a 
violation of ERISA, King registered complaints with both Fredericks and 
two in-house attorneys.91  She even requested an opinion letter from one 
of the attorneys on the appropriateness of the transfer.92  Subsequently, 
Fredericks restructured the responsibilities of King’s department, 
dividing authority between King and another employee.93  This led to a 
feud between King and the other employee, a feud that substantially 
affected the performance of the entire benefits department.94  Marriott 
again proposed a transfer of funds, and King once again objected, 
verbally and in writing, to Fredericks.95  Finally, Fredericks terminated 
both King and her feuding coworker, asserting that their continuing feud 
was hampering the operation of the department.96  King then sued 
Marriott.97 
In analyzing whether section 510 provides a remedy for King’s 
claim, the court focused on the “inquiry or proceeding” language of the 
provision.98  The court reasoned that the term proceeding does not apply 
to intra-company complaints but rather refers to administrative or legal 
actions.99  The court further reasoned that the term testify connotes a 
level of formality that does not include an employee’s oral complaint to 
his supervisor.100  The court noted that the antiretaliation provision of 
ERISA, like the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), contains narrower 
language than that found in other federal whistleblower statutes.101  
Therefore, the court found that the terms inquiry and proceeding are both 
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 89. Id. 
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limited to legal or administrative actions.102  At the very least, the terms 
require “something more formal than written or oral complaints made to 
a supervisor.”103 
Applying that reasoning to the King case, the court found that the 
plaintiff did not allege that she had been terminated because she had 
testified, or was about to testify, in any proceeding.104  Rather, she had 
merely alleged that she filed complaints with her supervisor, coworkers, 
and her employer’s attorneys.105  The court concluded that filing 
complaints is not the kind of activity protected under section 510.106 
The court then addressed the decisions of the Ninth and Fifth 
Circuits in Hashimoto and Anderson.107  The court found the reasoning in 
Anderson unpersuasive because that court “merely recited section 510 
without even addressing the facial inapplicability . . . to intra-office 
complaints.”108  The court found the Hashimoto reasoning equally 
unpersuasive, even though Hashimoto at least recognized the 
inapplicability of the statute to internal complaints.109  According to the 
court, Hashimoto rejected the most compelling interpretation of section 
510 in favor of a “fair” interpretation—construing the statute to protect 
persons who voice internal complaints.110  Thus, the Fourth Circuit 
would not extend section 510 to internal complaints because such an 
interpretation was not warranted under the language of the statute. 
In Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., the Second Circuit was the next 
to rule on the issue of internal complaints.111  The plaintiff, Nicolaou, 
worked for the defendant employer as its director of human resources.112  
Nicolaou discovered that the company had underfunded its 401(k) plan 
for over a decade.113  She brought this problem to the attention of various 
supervisors but soon became convinced that her employer was unwilling 
to address the problem.114  Nicolaou contacted an attorney for her 
                                                     
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 427–28. 
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employer, who conducted her own investigation into the problem and 
confirmed Nicolaou’s finding.115  She then had another meeting to 
discuss the issue with the president of the company.116  Nicolaou asserted 
that after this meeting a “campaign of retaliation” began against her, 
culminating in her termination.117  She filed suit against her former 
employer specifically alleging a violation of section 510 of ERISA.118 
In examining Nicolaou’s section 510 claim, the Second Circuit 
began by comparing the language of that statute with other similar 
federal whistleblower provisions.119  This comparison was short, with 
little attention paid to how courts have interpreted these similar 
statutes.120  Rather than focusing on a comparison of the federal 
whistleblower statutes, the court—much like the Fourth Circuit—based 
its decision on the “plain” language of section 510.121 
The Second Circuit may have reasoned that a comparison of case law 
interpreting section 510 of ERISA and other similar statutes such as the 
FLSA was unnecessary because it found the language of section 510 of 
ERISA unambiguously broader than the language of the FLSA statute.122  
Section 510 contains the term inquiry; by contrast, the FLSA statute only 
contains the term proceeding.123  The court reasoned that the inclusion of 
inquiry to section 510 of ERISA manifests Congress’s intent to protect 
those employees involved in the informal gathering of information.124  
Thus, section 510 protects the informal gathering of information because 
it is within the plain meaning of inquiry. 
Applying this reasoning to the facts of Nicolaou, the court concluded 
that if Nicolaou could prove that the president of the company contacted 
her to obtain information regarding the alleged underfunding of the plan, 
then section 510 would protect the action.125  The court reversed and 
remanded the case to determine if such contact occurred.126 
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The Second Circuit’s interpretation of section 510 in Nicolaou 
appears to be far broader than the Fourth Circuit’s.  The court stressed, 
however, that its finding was not contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s 
ruling.127  The court expressly agreed with the holding in King—section 
510 protects something more formal than internal complaints, whether 
written or oral, to a supervisor.128  The Second Circuit, however, gave 
more weight to the term inquiry than the Fourth Circuit did.  Given its 
reasoning in King, it seems unlikely that the Fourth Circuit would find 
that the meeting between Nicolaou and the president of the company 
connoted the level of formality requisite to garner section 510 protection.  
So while the Second and Fourth Circuits appear to agree that unsolicited 
internal complaints are not protected under section 510, their respective 
treatment of “solicited” complaints or information would most likely 
differ. 
The Second Circuit’s departure from the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning 
is troubling for a number of reasons.  First, the Second Circuit’s 
reasoning calls for more judicial line-drawing than the Fourth Circuit’s.  
When exactly does an “inquiry” begin?  At what point in the process 
does an informal complaint cross the threshold into privileged and 
protected status?  Further, the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the term 
inquiry is likely to lead to absurd results.  If an employee is protected 
once an informal investigation is conducted by his employer, what is to 
stop the employee from simply writing an anonymous letter detailing the 
alleged violations and then coming forward once the investigation has 
begun? 
Judge Pooler’s concurring opinion in Nicolaou raises another 
important point.  Judge Pooler argued that because Nicolaou was a 
fiduciary of the plan, she had a burden to remedy perceived violations or 
face personal liability.129  Judge Pooler argued that placing that kind of 
burden on fiduciaries is evidence that ERISA’s framers did not intend to 
leave fiduciaries unprotected.130  This indicates a strong argument that 
section 510 was intended to protect fiduciaries of ERISA plans.  The 
focus of this Comment, however, is the broader issue of whether the 
section protects employees in general, not just those with fiduciary 
responsibilities. 
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The most recent circuit to weigh in on the split was the Third Circuit 
in Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc.131  The plaintiff in the case, 
Edwards, asserted that she discovered numerous ERISA violations 
before her termination, including administering the group health plan on 
a discriminatory basis, lying to employees about the cost of group health 
insurance to dissuade them from opting into benefits, and enrolling 
noncitizens in ERISA plans by providing false social security numbers to 
insurance carriers.132  Edwards brought these complaints to 
management’s attention and was fired shortly thereafter.133  The sole 
issue on appeal was whether ERISA’s antiretaliation provision protected 
her internal complaints.134 
In reaching its decision, the court first recounted the circuit split and 
the reasoning behind each circuit’s decision.135  The court began its own 
analysis with its interpretation of the plain meaning of section 510.  First, 
the court examined the surrounding words and provisions to determine if 
there was ambiguity in the statute.136  The court determined that the plain 
meaning of the term inquiry is “a request for information.”137  Thus, to 
meet the terms of the statute, an employer must approach an employee 
and request information on possible ERISA violations.138  This is the 
same line of reasoning adopted by the Second Circuit.  The fact that 
unsolicited complaints may result in an inquiry is not dispositive.139  The 
court also found that unsolicited complaints do not fit the plain definition 
of proceeding either.140  According to the court, a proceeding requires a 
more formal action such as the progression of a lawsuit or testimony in 
front of a tribunal.141 
Similar to King and Nicolaou, the Third Circuit found persuasive the 
fact that Congress used narrower language for ERISA’s whistleblower 
provision when broader language was available.142  However, the court 
relied on what it characterized as the “plain and unambiguous” language 
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of the statute as the foundation of its reasoning.143  The Third Circuit 
noted that ERISA should be liberally construed and that “[i]f Section 510 
were ambiguous, we would construe the provision in favor of plan 
participants.”144  However, the Third Circuit held that section 510—and 
subsequently Congress’s intent—is not ambiguous.145  In so holding, the 
Third Circuit rejected Hashimoto’s reasoning that failing to protect 
internal complaints undercuts the purpose of section 510.146  If Congress 
had wished to protect against such an event, according to the Third 
Circuit, it would have provided broader language in the provision.147 
The dissenting opinion of Edwards by Judge Cowen presented the 
current argument of those in favor of protecting internal complaints.  
First, the dissent noted that section 510 of ERISA is a critical statutory 
safeguard.148  In support of this, the dissent cited Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. 
McClendon.149  In that case, the Supreme Court, analyzing section 510, 
stated: “Congress viewed this section as a crucial part of ERISA because, 
without it, employers would be able to circumvent the provision of 
promised benefits.”150  Thus, in the dissent’s view, the majority adopted 
an opinion that is inconsistent with common sense and therefore 
unsustainable.151  The dissent noted that the majority’s arbitrary line-
drawing on the issue of what inquiry means is likely to cause problematic 
results.152  For example, if an employee brings a complaint to 
management and during the conversation the manager asks several 
follow-up questions, is this now an “inquiry” protected under section 
510?153  The dissent believed that it would be odd to allow an employer 
to immediately fire an employee after she makes an informal complaint 
rather than initiating an investigation.154 
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 146. Id. at 223–24. 
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The dissent further argued that the majority’s interpretation of the 
term inquiry leaves an entire class of employees unprotected.155  These 
employees have a “responsibility to conduct potentially sensitive and 
damaging investigations into possible ERISA violations” and need more 
protection than employees who simply answer a few questions.156  In 
light of all of this, the dissent believed that the language of section 510 is 
at the very least ambiguous and should thus be interpreted broadly to 
include “internal workplace complaints.”157 
III. ANALYSIS 
The majority view that favors excluding unsolicited internal 
complaints from section 510 protection is correct, but for ultimately 
flawed and unsatisfying reasons.  The dissenting opinion in Edwards did 
a nice job of highlighting this very point.  The crux of the Second, Third, 
and Fourth Circuits’ reasoning was that the language of section 510 of 
ERISA is unambiguous and plain. While the plain meaning of statutory 
words is often enough to resolve ambiguities and disagreements on 
statutory interpretation, in this case it is ultimately unsatisfying because 
it leads to a seemingly counter-majoritarian result.  It seems remarkably 
unfair to say section 510 affords no protection for an employee acting 
selflessly for the good of the public.  If the majority had expanded their 
analysis to explain why Congress would intend such a seemingly 
incongruous result, it would make their ultimate decision seem less harsh 
and more rational. 
Of the three, the Third Circuit provided the most expansive basis for 
its opinion.  The Edwards court noted repeatedly that the whistleblower 
protection statute is comparable to that of other federal provisions, 
except that it contains more narrowly construed language.158  However, 
the Third Circuit failed to make such a comparison the basis of its 
reasoning.  Instead, it relied almost solely on the provisions’ differing 
language to support its thesis that the statute is facially unambiguous. 
Courts’ reasoning should incorporate an extensive comparison of the 
federal whistleblower provisions and the case law interpreting them, 
rather than using them as perfunctory support for an unsatisfying 
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conclusion.  The circuits should have made their statutory interpretation 
only the first step of a three-step process.  Therefore, a sounder and more 
satisfying explanation of the majority’s conclusion results from 
examining (1) case law interpreting similar statutory provisions; (2) the 
legislative history and purpose of section 510 of ERISA compared with 
that of other, broader provisions such as Title VII; and, finally, (3) the 
underlying rights protected by section 510 of ERISA balanced against 
the opposing interests of employers. 
A. Case Law Interpreting Similar Whistleblower Provisions 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains a whistleblower 
provision similar to section 510 of ERISA.  This provision protects 
employees who have “participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”159  This is a “participation 
clause” and is common in federal whistleblower protection statutes.160  
The purpose behind such a clause is that employee participation in 
investigations and hearings is essential to proper enforcement of federal 
statutes.161  Courts construe participation clauses very broadly.162  For 
example, courts construe the clause to protect employees who file suits 
against both former and current employers.163  However, the participation 
clause is not the tool courts use to protect employees who make 
unsolicited internal complaints. 
Several federal whistleblower protection statutes contain an 
“opposition clause” as well as a participation clause.164  These opposition 
clauses typically make it unlawful to discriminate against any employee 
who has opposed a practice made unlawful by the federal act.165  These 
clauses, however, are less typical than participation clauses and have 
been construed both narrowly—to protect employees who testify in 
                                                     
 159. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (emphasis added); see also Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 § 4(d), 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (protecting employees who have “participated 
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 160. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 4, at 191–92. 
 161. Id. at 191. 
 162. See id. at 191–92. 
 163. Id. at 192. 
 164. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
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enforcement proceedings—and broadly—to protect employees who 
make flippant remarks to and around their superiors.166  Thus, courts 
have generally protected employee conduct under opposition clauses so 
long as it is reasonable.167 
An example of the breadth of opposition clauses is found in the 
Fourth Circuit’s decision in Armstrong v. Index Journal Co.168  
Armstrong held that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision protects internal 
complaints made to management in a nondisruptive manner.169  The 
plaintiff complained to management on numerous occasions about her 
job classification and the differences in pay between categories of 
employees.170  These internal complaints led to her termination.171  She 
subsequently filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) and initiated an action against her former 
employer.172 
In assessing Armstrong’s retaliation complaint, the court first noted 
that under Title VII’s whistleblower protection statute it is unlawful for 
an employer to discriminate against an employee “because he has 
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice.”173  The 
court stated that an employee’s behavior need not be a formal action 
against their employer in order to gain protection under the statute.174  
Rather, the court expressly interpreted the opposition clause “to 
encompass informal protests, such as voicing complaints to employers or 
using an employer’s grievance procedures.”175  The court concluded that 
Armstrong was incontrovertibly discharged because she “opposed 
practices made unlawful by the Act.”176 
The court in Armstrong did not base any of its analysis or reasoning 
on the participation clause of Title VII.  In fact, there is no need to do so.  
Courts consider the opposition clause broad enough to encompass the 
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activity in which the plaintiff engaged.  Seen in this light, the inclusion 
by Congress of both an opposition and a participation clause in the 
statute encompasses and protects as much employee conduct as possible.  
The participation clause protects employees engaged in more formal 
proceedings or complaints.  By contrast, the opposition clause protects 
employees from being retaliated against for availing themselves of their 
employers’ internal dispute resolution mechanisms.  The opposition 
clause encourages employees to bring unlawful practices to the attention 
of their supervisors so that the violation may be resolved without the 
need for litigation.  Therefore, the opposition clause by design protects a 
wider variety of activity than the participation clause would be able to do 
alone. 
The broad nature of the opposition clause was also evident in Carter-
Obayuwana v. Howard University.177  There, a tenured university 
professor issued a memorandum that accused her supervisor of having a 
“sexist mentality” against her.178  Supervisors in both her department and 
the administrative offices of the university received copies of the 
memo.179  The department attempted to resolve the issue through several 
failed attempts at mediation.180  The plaintiff then sued her employer, 
alleging Title VII violations.181 
The court held that to prove a prima facie case of retaliation under 
Title VII’s opposition clause, the plaintiff must show (1) that she was 
engaged in the protected activity; (2) that her employer took an adverse 
employment action against her, such as demotion or termination; and (3) 
a nexus existed between steps one and two.182  The court then sought to 
determine whether the plaintiff’s memo constituted protected activity 
within the meaning of the statute.183  Whereas the trial court had found 
that the plaintiff did not engage in protected activity until she contacted 
an enforcement agency, the appellate court found that writing the memo 
constituted protected activity under the opposition clause.184  The court 
reasoned that activity need not be in the form of a formal complaint for 
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Title VII’s opposition clause to protect it.185  Thus, the protection of the 
opposition clause extends to employees’ informal complaints to their 
superiors within the business.186  This protection extends even when the 
complaint, as it did here, fails to employ “‘magic words’ such as 
‘discrimination.’”187  Thus, plaintiff’s first memorandum accusing her 
supervisor of having a “sexist mentality” towards her was enough to gain 
protection from retaliation under Title VII’s opposition clause.188 
This case is indicative of the expansive breadth of an opposition 
clause within a federal whistleblower statute.  The plaintiff made a series 
of escalating complaints to her supervisors, but the court concluded that 
she had done enough to gain the protection of the statute simply by 
promulgating a memorandum containing a litany of unsupported 
accusations against her immediate supervisor. 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) 
contains an opposition clause similar to the one contained in Title VII.189  
For example, in Rufo v. Dave & Buster’s, Inc., the plaintiff complained 
that he was fired in retaliation for making internal complaints about age 
discrimination.190  Rufo felt that the promotion of a less qualified 
manager above him “amounted to age discrimination in violation of the 
ADEA.”191  Similar to a Title VII claim, the court reasoned that to 
establish a prima facie case under the ADEA, Rufo must first show that 
he was engaged in protected activity.192  In this instance, Rufo, the 
defendant, and the court all agreed that filing an internal complaint of 
age discrimination was a protected activity under the ADEA’s opposition 
clause.193 
These cases are important for analysis because they present factual 
scenarios similar to those facing courts deciding whether to apply section 
510 of ERISA to internal complaints.  The cases are indicative of the fact 
that in various statutes Congress has provided a provision broad enough 
to encompass and protect an array of employee activity—a statutory 
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provision it declined to provide employees in ERISA.  One must 
consider the underlying rights protected by the acts to reach an 
explanation for the inclusion of a broader provision in some federal 
statutes and not in others.  It is possible that Congress desired to provide 
employees more protection and incentive to blow the whistle against 
employers who discriminate based upon immutable characteristics than 
against those who may be committing ERISA violations.  In other words, 
the act of balancing employer rights and interests versus employee rights 
and interests194 weighs more heavily in favor of employees under these 
statutes than it does under section 510 of ERISA. 
Examining this balancing of interests creates a far more sustainable 
position than the majority circuits have adopted.  Even if one can 
characterize the language of section 510 as ambiguous, the statutory 
language clearly still protects something less than those federal 
whistleblower statutes containing an opposition clause.  The fact that 
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 only a few years before 
ERISA and expressly included an opposition clause bolsters this point.  
If Congress had wanted to afford employees exercising their rights under 
ERISA the same level of protection as those exercising their rights under 
Title VII, it could have done just that.  While the Second and Third 
Circuits acknowledged this fact, they needed to go further, making it the 
focal point of their reasoning and not just support for an unsatisfying 
interpretation of the statute. 
B. Comparative Legislative History: ERISA Versus Title VII 
The legislative histories for ERISA and Title VII’s antiretaliation 
provision yield important insights into why one act protects internal 
complaints and the other does not.  The purpose in examining the two 
histories is to discern the congressional intent and the legislative goal 
that the provisions were enacted to achieve.  In examining the legislative 
history of each antiretaliation provision, one finds that Title VII was 
intended to achieve a far broader goal than section 510 of ERISA.  To 
this end, Title VII requires a more expansive and protective 
whistleblower statute.  By contrast, section 510 of ERISA was intended 
to achieve a far narrower goal, and therefore contains a more narrowly 
tailored antiretaliation statute. 
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Title VII was an effort by the federal government to eliminate all 
employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.195  While the legislative history on Title VII’s 
antiretaliation provision is relatively sparse, courts have consistently 
interpreted it as providing exceptionally broad protections with the 
objective of ensuring employees have unmitigated access to the remedies 
provided by the act.196  Furthermore, courts often look to the EEOC—the 
agency charged with enforcing Title VII—for help in interpreting the 
statute.197  The EEOC has noted that the enforcement of Title VII is 
dependent upon the willingness of individuals to voice opposition to 
employment discrimination.198  It is therefore imperative that employees 
be able to voice complaints and opposition without fear that their 
employers will take retaliatory action against them.199  Otherwise, the 
goal of Title VII’s retaliatory provision—to ensure that employees 
exercise their rights in order to eliminate workplace discrimination—
cannot be achieved.200 
By contrast, ERISA serves a much narrower purpose.  ERISA 
largely deals with private plans where the focus is on individual 
investment decisions.201  The goal of ERISA is to ensure the security of 
these investments.202  It is readily apparent that this is a far narrower goal 
than that of Title VII. 
Although the legislative history behind ERISA’s antiretaliation 
provision deals largely with the first sentence of section 510, one can still 
glean some important insight from its interpretation.  In interpreting 
section 510, the Supreme Court has held that Congress’s intent was to 
“protect[] plan participants from termination motivated by an employer’s 
desire to prevent a pension from vesting.”203  This assertion is bolstered 
by a Senate report on the antiretaliation provision, which the Supreme 
Court relied on in interpreting congressional intent behind section 510:204 
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 These provisions were added by the Committee in the face of 
evidence that in some plans a worker’s pension rights or the 
expectations of those rights were interfered with by the use of 
economic sanctions or violent reprisals.  Although the instances of 
these occurrences are relatively small in number, the Committee has 
concluded that safeguards are required to preclude this type of abuse 
from being carried out and in order to completely secure the rights and 
expectations brought into being by this landmark reform legislation.205 
According to the Supreme Court in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. 
McClendon, that case presented the exact factual scenario Congress had 
in mind when enacting section 510.206  In Ingersoll-Rand Co., an 
employee was fired four months before his pension was set to vest.207  
The employee alleged that the primary reason for his termination was the 
company’s desire to avoid contributing to his pension fund.208  This 
factual scenario is further evidence that Congress’s goal in enacting 
section 510 was narrower than Title VII’s antiretaliation provision. 
The legislative history of each act makes it clear that the 
antiretaliation provisions of section 510 and Title VII are meant to 
achieve different goals.  Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is meant to 
encourage employees to voice their opposition to discrimination without 
fear of reprisal.  It is representative of Congress’s goal that employees 
should feel completely free to access the statute’s remedial measures to 
eliminate workplace discrimination.  It is clear then what purpose the 
inclusion of an opposition clause serves.  Without an opposition clause, 
the primary purpose of the provision would be easily circumvented and 
its inclusion would be almost useless.  If an employer fires an employee 
the second she makes a complaint regarding alleged discrimination, she 
probably will not feel free to access Title VII’s remedial measures.  
Indeed, she may never get the chance, as her employer could terminate 
her shortly after voicing any displeasure.  Workplace discrimination 
would continue to be a problem because opposing it would result in swift 
reprisal.  Thus, the opposition clause was purposely included to broaden 
the effect of the statute.  It provides remarkably broad protections to 
achieve a remarkably broad goal. 
                                                     
 205. S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 35. 
 206. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at 143 (“We have no doubt that this claim is prototypical of 
the kind Congress intended to cover under § 510.”). 
 207. Id. at 135. 
 208. Id. at 135–36. 
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On the other hand, the legislative history of section 510 of ERISA 
reveals that its goal is more specific and narrowly tailored when 
compared to that of Title VII.  Congress wanted to ensure the security of 
private pension plans.  The key word to focus on is private.  These plans 
involve the personal decisions of individuals and their employers 
regarding the employee’s future income.  It is possible that Congress did 
not want to burden these decisions with an overbearing regulatory 
scheme and therefore provided a more narrowly tailored provision to 
enforce it.  Had Congress’s goal been broader—as it was in Title VII—it 
would undoubtedly have provided a more expansive provision to achieve 
the goal. 
Furthermore, an opposition clause is not integral to ERISA the way 
that it is to Title VII.  Title VII requires employees to be forthcoming and 
make internal complaints both to bring discrimination to the attention of 
authorities and to prove that the alleged discrimination took place.  By 
contrast, the willingness of employees to be forthcoming in an ERISA 
context is not as important for two reasons.  First, as Judge Pooler noted 
in Nicolaou, ERISA makes plan fiduciaries personally liable for 
breaching any of their obligations or responsibilities under the plan.209  
This liability includes failing to remedy perceived improprieties.210  
Because of this, ERISA fiduciaries have a duty to report violations.211  
Consequently, the enforcement of ERISA is not as dependent upon 
internal complaints the way that Title VII is because there is an internal 
mechanism for reporting violations.  Second, as stated earlier, ERISA 
has substantial reporting and recordkeeping requirements.212  In light of 
this, once a violation is made, the information necessary to prove that 
violation is likely contained within those records.  The cooperation and 
participation of employees affected by the violation may not even be 
necessary to prove the violation.  Thus, where internal complaints play 
an integral part in the enforcement of Title VII, they are arguably not 
necessary either to monitor or enforce ERISA. 
By contrast, the participation clause helps ERISA and section 510 to 
achieve its goal in an important way.  Namely, a participation clause 
                                                     
 209. Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 330 (2d Cir. 2005) (Pooler, J., concurring); 
see also 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006). 
 210. See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 331 (Pooler, J., concurring) (stating that to avoid personal 
liability a fiduciary is strongly encouraged to remedy improprieties). 
 211. See id. 
 212. See 29 U.S.C. § 1059 (2006 & Supp. III 2010) (listing the recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements of employers). 
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encourages those who do participate in a formal inquiry or proceeding to 
do so truthfully and honestly without fear of reprisal.  A participation 
clause alleviates employees’ fear that their truthful testimony will result 
in reprisal from their employer.  Thus, protecting these employees from 
retaliation promotes truthfulness in testimony and helps legitimate claims 
sought to be protected by section 510 succeed. 
Thus, the legislative history of section 510 of ERISA shows that it 
was enacted to achieve a narrow goal.  While a participation clause helps 
this goal to be achieved, it can easily be accomplished without the need 
for the expansive protection of an opposition clause.  In light of this, the 
majority view favoring no protection for unsolicited internal complaints 
is supported by the legislative history of ERISA. 
C. Balancing the Underlying Right Protected Against Legitimate 
Employer Interests 
Even considering all of the prior analysis, the exclusion of internal 
complaints from section 510 protection still seems counter-majoritarian.  
To hold that employees who act selflessly to remedy real or perceived 
violations have no remedy under the law seems draconian.  To 
understand why internal complaints are not protected, one must again 
consider that Congress has other goals in mind in constructing 
whistleblower protections than solely providing remedies for retaliation.  
The significant cost, financial and otherwise, that whistleblower 
protection inflicts upon employers necessitates balancing public policy 
goals against legitimate employer interests.213  Thus, whistleblower 
provisions correlate to the importance of the right protected by the 
underlying statute. 
For example, as was discussed above, Title VII’s purpose is to 
achieve a very broad and expansive goal—eliminating workplace 
discrimination based upon race.214  The root causes and underlying 
motivations of Congress in creating this legislation are traceable to the 
very beginnings of the country in the Declaration of Independence’s 
assertion that all persons are created equal.215  Likewise, Title VII is a 
recognition that characteristics such as race are immutable and “utterly 
                                                     
 213. See Fisher et al., supra note 26, at 133–34; Ramirez, supra note 25, at 224. 
 214. BNA OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 195, at 1. 
 215. Id. at 17. 
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irrelevant to employment decisions.”216  In this light, it is easy to see how 
the underlying purpose and rights protected by Title VII trump even 
legitimate employer concerns over cost and workplace unity.  Employers 
may have a right to make managerial decisions without interference from 
the federal government, but when those decisions result in discrimination 
against employees for characteristics wholly unrelated to any legitimate 
employment decision, Title VII allows and encourages federal intrusion 
to correct the injustice.  Furthermore, because racial discrimination is 
often attributable to insidious and evil prejudices and predispositions, 
Congress is justified in providing employers with less latitude in making 
employment decisions.217  By contrast, when there are reasonable bases 
for employment decisions, managers have more latitude and leeway in 
making them.218 
ERISA seeks to regulate employers’ handling of employer-sponsored 
private pension systems.219  This type of regulation differs facially from 
Title VII in several respects.  First, the mishandling of private pension 
funds does not stem from insidious predispositions the same way that 
racial discrimination does.  Therefore, the whistleblower protection 
provision in the ERISA context should balance more favorably toward 
the employer.  Similarly, decisions regarding employee funds and 
contribution systems are closely related to the functions and kinds of 
decisions managers are in charge of in a business.  By contrast, a 
person’s race or religious beliefs are entirely unrelated to management.  
Because ERISA decisions may relate to legitimate managerial concerns, 
it seems natural that employers would have more latitude in making 
those decisions. 
Thus, while the regulation of pension interests is an important 
concern of Congress, it does not seem to necessitate the same level of 
government intrusion as the regulation of workplace discrimination.  
Because of this, employers have a better argument that the minority 
circuits’ expansive and broad whistleblower protection does more harm 
than good by forcing them to expend time and money defending greater 
numbers of allegations and charges from employees, all while intruding 
                                                     
 216. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 228 n.10 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
 217. See Anne Marie Tracy & Norma Skoog, Is Business Judgment a Catch-22 for ADEA 
Plaintiffs? The Impact of Smith v. City of Jackson on Future ADEA Employment Litigation, 33 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 231, 254 (2008). 
 218. See id. 
 219. WOOTEN, supra note 44, at 1. 
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on the employer’s ability to make legitimate managerial decisions and 
run their business as they see fit.  The majority circuits’ limited 
protection better balances the interests of employers with those of the 
public.  The majority achieves this balance by ensuring a cause of action 
for those whose employers interfere with their pension rights and freeing 
employers from the cost of having to investigate and defend every claim 
for wrongful discharge brought under section 510 of ERISA.  Thus, the 
broader section 510 protection advocated by the minority circuits does 
not adequately account for the legitimate interests of employers, whereas 
the majority circuit’s view does account for such interests. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, if whistleblower statutes seek to attain some balance 
between the rights of employees and the interests of employers, it would 
appear that in this instance the interests weigh in the favor of the latter.  
Of the five circuits to address the issue, three have determined that 
section 510 does protect internal complaints.  While these circuits 
ultimately came to the correct conclusion, their reasoning remains 
suspect.  All three circuits based their decisions on the “plain language” 
within section 510 of ERISA.  The circuits concluded that the terms 
inquiry and proceeding do not encompass an internal complaint given to 
management.  This argument, however, results in arbitrary line-drawing 
and fails to sustain itself in the face of convincing criticism.  How can 
the statute allow for such a seemingly unjust result?  How can the 
language be both perfectly clear and yet the subject of a split amongst the 
circuits?  The better argument calls for making statutory interpretation a 
mere component of a broader three-part analysis.  The basis of this 
analysis is an intensive comparison of ERISA’s whistleblower provision 
with those contained in similar federal acts.  When one does this, it 
becomes clear that those statutes protecting internal complaints do so 
explicitly, and Congress’s exclusion of internal complaints from section 
510 of ERISA is purposeful.  Further support for this proposition comes 
from examining the legislative history of section 510 and comparing it 
with that of Title VII.  The goals these statutes attempt to achieve differ 
significantly in both their purpose and their breadth.  Title VII’s purpose 
is far broader in scope than ERISA and relies heavily on the willingness 
of employees to speak out against discriminatory practices.  Therefore, 
Title VII needs a broader whistleblower provision to achieve its purpose.  
By contrast, ERISA’s purpose is narrower and not as dependent on the 
willingness of individuals to be forthcoming to pursue it.  Therefore, 
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ERISA’s whistleblower provision is narrow, and the protection of 
internal complaints is not as necessary.  Finally, there is a good argument 
that the amount of protection afforded employees in antiretaliation 
statutes correlates directly to the importance of the rights they protect.  
Again, Title VII protects employees from discriminatory practices.  An 
employee’s right not to be treated differently based on their race or 
ethnicity is an important one that requires extraordinarily broad 
protection.  By contrast, ERISA protects the security of employees’ 
retirement—an important goal but arguably less important than that of 
Title VII.  In this light, the whistleblower provision within ERISA is 
narrower because it correlates to the right protected by that Act.  Thus, 
even if section 510 is ambiguous, a fair interpretation still does not afford 
protection of internal complaints. 
